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Introduction
The increasing sophistication of computers has made
digital manipulation of photographic images (as well as
other digitally-recorded artifacts, such as audio and
video) incredibly easy to perform and, as time goes on,
increasingly difficult to detect. Today, every picture
appearing in newspapers and magazines has been
digitally altered to some degree, with the severity
varying from the trivial (cleaning up "noise" and
removing distracting backgrounds) to the point,of
deception (articles of clothing removed, heads attached
to other people's bodies, the complete rearrangement of
city skylines). As the power, flexibility and ubiquity of
image-altering computers continues to increase, the
well-known adage that "the photograph doesn't lie" will
continue to become an anachronism.
A solution to this problem comes from a concept called
Digital Signatures, which incorporates modern
cryptographic techniques to authenticate electronic mail
messages. [1] [2] ("Authenticate" in this case means you
can be sure that the message has not been altered, and
that the sender's identity has not been forged.) The
technique can serve not only to authenticate images, but
also to help the photographer retain and enforce
copyright protection when the concept of "electronic
original" is no longer meaningful.
Background on Digital Signatures
The concept of a digital signature builds upon a recent
encryption technique called "Public Key Encryption"
[3]. Older encryption/decryption schemes require that
both the sender and receiver possess the same secret
"key": the sender uses the key to transform the text
message into ciphertext, and the receiver uses the same
key to perform an inverse transformation on the
ciphertext, revealing the original text message. If the
correct key transforms the ciphertext into unreadable
garbage, it is reasonable to conclude that either the
wrong key is being used, the message has been altered,
or the sender has been impersonated by someone
ignorant of the correct key. The historic drawback to
this secret key encryption scheme has been in the secure
distribution of keys; key disclosure must occur out-of-
band, either transmitted via an expensive alternate path
or arranged when sender and receiver were proximate.
Public key encryption techniques differ in that they
enable the recipient of a message to de,crypt it using a
key that is different from the one used by the sender to
encrypt it. All public key cryptography is based on the
principle that it is easy to multiply two large prime
numbers together, but extremely difficult (taking
perhaps centuries using today's supercomputers) to work
backwards and uncover the factors that could have been
used to generate the resulting number.
Public Key Encryption employs two different keys: a
private key, which is held by the more security
conscious party, and a corresponding public key, which
need not be kept secret. The public key is generated
based upon the private key, making the pair unique to
each other.
The public key scheme is illustrated in Figure 1 and
works as follows: to send a secret message that only the
recipient can read, the recipient would first make his/her
public key known to the sender through any non-secure
medium, such as a letter, a telephone conversation, or a
newspaper ad. Anyone wishing to send a secure
message would encrypt the message using this public
key and send it to the recipient. The recipient, having
sole possession of the corresponding private key, is the
only one able to decrypt the message. The need to
transmit a secret key that both parties must possess
beforehand has been eliminated. The tradeoff in this
case is that, although only the recipient can read the
message, anyone who obtains the public key can send a
message with anonymity. 1
1 The described scenario can also be used as the first step in a
process of exchanging secret keys to allow for conventional
secure message transmission, elinainating any of the drawbacks
of the one-way authenticatability. [1 ], [4 ]
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has briefly reviewed features important to high-capacity photographic image data
capture, classification, compression, storage, retrieval, and display. Also described was a NASA-KSC
space shuttle ground processing prototype IDBMS under development which provides knowledge-
based assistance for image classification and retrieval. Finally, a design for a networked PC-LAN
IDBMS was presented. A conclusion reached from reviews of the prototype system is that it has
distinct advantages over the present manual system and cost efficiencies will result as the system is
implemented. Further, commercial potential exists for this integrated technology.
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The process described above can also be implemented
"backwards" to great advantage. In a second scenario, it
is the sender who maintains possession of the private
original plaintext message, and then encrypting the hash
using the sender's private key, as shown in Figure 2.
The result is a second digital file (referred to as a
Public Keyl Private
100100Ol 010101 ]_ [ 1001000101010
0101011011110_ Encrypted_0101011011110
1010101101010r_--v T_.Tj_w- ]
11010010o0111J Encr_on , Message _10101011010101101001000111
DecryptionOriginal message
(couldbe text. Original message
image file, digital
video or audio)
Rgure 1: W'dh Public Kay Encryption, the encoding (public)key and decoding (private)
keys are different, and it Is computationallydifficultto derive one given the other. To
sand a message that only the receiver can read, the non-secret public key is used to
enctypt; the secret private key is used to decrypt. Encryptingwith the private key
forgoes confidentialityin favor of authentioability:if the public key can decode it, then
only the one holding the private key could have generated the message.
key, and anyone who has the widely disseminated
corresponding public key could decrypt this message.
Although this procedure no longer performs the
traditional function of encryption (which is to provide
confidential communication between two parties), it
does provide a way to insure that messages have not
been forged: only the private key could have produced a
message that is decipherable by the corresponding
public key.
This gives us the foundation for message authentication:
if the private key remains private, then only the private
key holder can produce messages decipherable by the
public key. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to
reverse-engineer the public key and ascertain the
original private key. Without knowledge of the private
key, a counterfeit message cannot be forged.
Digital signatures build upon these public key
cryptographic techniques and allow you to authenticate
the contents of the message as well as the identity of the
sender, without obscuring the original message. The
signatures are produced by creating a hash 2 of the
2A hash is a mathematical function which maps values from a
large domain into a smaller range. For example, a checksum is
a simple kind of hash. A more complex example of a hash
algorithm would involve dividing a binary t-de into a collection
of, say, 16 Kilobit pieces and performing a cumulative
Exclusive OR function between successive pieces produces a
simple 16 Kilobit "hash" which is smaller than the original file
yet is practically unique to iu (Many more complex and secure
transformations are also possible.) Changing a single bit in the
original message produces a very different hash output; and
s/gnature) w h i c h
accompanies the original
plaintext message. To
emphasize: THE
ORIGINAL MESSAGE
IS UNTOUCHED; only
the message's hash is
encrypted. This way the
original file can be read by
all, yet if you wish to
authenticate it you can
decrypt the message's
unique digital signature
using the public key. If
the decrypted digital
signature and an
independent hash on the
file in question match,
both the integrity of the
message and the
authenticity of the sender
can be assured.
This digital signature technique is very general; it can be
applied not only to 1-dimensional symbolic text (such as
electronic mail) but also to any n-dimensional digital
pattern (such as digital video, digital audio, and/or
digital holograms).
Digital Cameras
Standard digital cameras are filmless; they sense light
and color via an electronic device (such as a Charge
Coupled Device (CCD)), and produce as output a
computer file that describes the image using l's and O's
arranged in a meaningful, pre-defined format. Often
this digital image file is stored on a small mass-storage
medium inside the camera itself (such as floppy disk or
magneto-optical disk) for later transference to a large
computer. Alternatively, the image file can be sent
directly to the computer via a transmission medium.
Once inside the computer it then can be read and then
easily altered in any number of different ways.
In the proposed digital camera (Figure 3) we wish to
authenticate the initial image file as it emerges from the
camera. To accomplish this, the camera produces two
output Ides for each captured image as shown in Figure
reverse engineering a message so it will have a given hash value
and also make sense to the reader is virtually impossible. A
digital signature can then be created by encrypting the hashing
output using the sender's private key.
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4: the first is an all-digital industry-standard file format
representing the captured image. The second would be
an encrypted "digital signature" produced by applying
Pdvate KeyJl_
ioooooooooo01101111010101011 "=I 1011010001010110100100011 _ Digital I10101001101001011 - 10011110 Signature I
101101011010001011 nctlon Image Hash Encryption
Original message (could
be text, image file, digital
video or audio)
originally produced. If on the other hand at least a
single bit is different, the two hashes will not even
closely match and the image's integrity will not be
afOrmed.
Rgure 2: The Digital Signature Is created by producing a complex checksum called
a "hash', which Is then encrypted using the pdvate key. Attempting to forge this
signature without knowledge of the pdvate key would take decades using today's
supercomputer technologies.
the camera's unique private key (embedded within the
camera's secure microprocessor) to a hash of the
captured image file, using the procedure described in
[4]. It is the responsibility of the user to keep Wack of
both files once they leave the camera, since both are
required to authenticate the image.
Once the digital image file and the digital signature
are generated by the camera and stored in computer
memory, the image file's integrity can later be
affirmed by using a public key decoding program,
which can be freely distributed to users and
certification authorities via conventional software
distribution techniques. This verification program
(illustrated in Figure 5), which has
no knowledge of either the public
or private keys, takes as input the
digital image file in question, its
accompanying digital signature
file, and the public key which is
unique to the originating camera.
(It is perfectly reasonable to have
the public key double as the
camera's serial number.) The
program then calculates its own
hash on the digital image file (the
hashing algorithm need not be kept
a secret), and uses the public key to
decode the digital signature to
reveal the hash originally \
calculated by the camera at the
time the image was taken (Figure
6). If these two hashes match, it is
certain to any required degree that
the digital image in question is
indeed identical to what the camera
If the technique is to be
effective (i.e., no false
positives or false
negatives) and extended
to larger data sets such
as digital audio, digital
video or even digital
holograms, we must
build upon the
accomplishments of the
computer mass storage
industry, which has
already achieved the
ability to store and
deliver extremely large
binary data sets without
errors. Analog
techniques (such as audio cassette tape or file NTSC
encoding on today's video tape formats) or non-
corrected digital formats (such as the popular audio
compact disc (CD), which is so unreliable that CD
player manufacturers now employ "over-sampling" to
combat the problem of missed bits) introduce a large
amount of errors upon playback that are normally
imperceptible to the viewer or listener, but are
intolerable for the purposes of image authentication.
Measures of Protection
[ PublicKey I
The scheme as described above is resistant to forgery
attempts since the secret private key (which is known
Private Key I
storedin hereJ
MassStorage
DigitalCamera BlockDiagram
Figur,e..3: _ Trustwort,.hyDigitalCameraslartswitha digitalsensorinsteadof film,
a.nooellversme image oirecuyIn a computer-compatibleformat. The secure
mcroprocessor responsiblefor theencryptionof thedigitalsignatureis programmed
with the privatekeyat the factory. The publickey necessaryfor laterauthentication
appearsinthe image'sborderaswellas on the camerabody.
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only by the camera's manufacturer) is embedded in a
probe-proof microprocessor which itself is deeply
integrated into the camera's system (Figure 1). Even if
some adept pirate were to dissect the cmlaera and replace
ImageFile
Mass Storage
Figure 4: When a singlephoto is taken, two files are produced:
a standard digital image file, and an encrypted digital
signature. The files can be stored on a variety of media, such
as a Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) CD or the computer's
mass storage device. The image can then be accessed and
used just as any other computer data.
the chip with one containing a homebrew key, the
digital signature produced thereafter would not be
decodable by any public key published by the
manufacturer.
The advantages to freely distributing the verification
software and valid public keys
are great; with the software
freely available verification can
become commonplace and
routine. No special certification
authority need be called in for
routine checks, no fees are
required, no big fuss is made,
and no bad-faith climate
amongst the parties involved
need be created as a result of
being challenged. But the mass
distribution of verification
software does carry one danger:
it would be easy for someone to
create a bogus program that
looks, behaves, and has the same
file length as the genuine
verification software, with the
only difference being it always
proclaims a "match" regardless
of the integrity of the image being verified. With the
software freely and widely available this is not a large
risk, as additional copies can be easily obtained from
multiple sources and a best 2-out-of-3 scheme can be
employed. When the stakes are high and it is extremely
important that the verification software be known to be
genuine, an independent certification authority or the
manufacturer could then be called in to provide their
own copies of the software and their own lists of public
keys at the time of verification.
The algorithms and private key necessary for encrypting
the additional digital signature file from within the
camera are to be embedded inside a new breed of
secure microprocessors whose ROM contents
cannot be observed outside of the factory. Because
the private key used for encryption is hard-coded
into this chip by the manufacturer (who must then
ensure the private key remains secret), credibility of
the camera's output becomes an extension of that of
the manufacturer; a digital signature from the
camera can be considered to be just as reliable and
secure as if the signature had been generated by the
manufacturer. 3
Each camera should possess its own unique pair of
private and public keys, with the private key etched
into the camera's secure microcontroller and the
public key stored in three places: in a public key list
kept by the manufacturer, on the camera body itself
(which can then also double as the camera's serial
number), and in the colorful border that contains more
data about the captured image (see "A Special Border"
section below for more details on this idea). Assigning
unique keys to each camera has the benefit of avoiding
instant obsolescence which would occur if only one
private key were used for all cameras, and that key were
Vodficatio_
SoftwareJ
Figure 5: To authentcare the Image, publicdomain verification software Is run on a
standard computer platform. The program takes as input the image file in question, the
digital signature, and the camera's serial number (which doubles as its public key).
to be compromised. An even higher level of security
3 Any company involved with the development of a
Trustworthy Digital Camera would have to address the issue of
liability, for if the security of the private key were ever to be
compromised (for example by a disgruntled employee who
steals a private key and uses it to generate false authenticatable
images), the lawsuits brought on as the result of a false positive
would necessitate significant insurance coverage.
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Standard Format Image File
Verification Software
10010001010100101
01101111010101011
01010110100100011
10101001101001011
_--_ 01101011010001011
I{ !PublicK.yl
...... _ _" T FunctiOn
e ii Ir; --_/J_ --1101101001 110110100 I
i -_ ) -110011110[ _ 1100111101
d
i Decryptlon Original Image Hash
l Image Hash of file in Question
Figure 8: The verification software computes its own hash of the image in question,
and compares it to the original hash which has been decrypted using the public key.
ff the image in question has not been manipulated, the decrypted digital signature
and the program's own hashing function will match, resulting in an authentication. If
even a single bit is different, the two hashes will not even closely match, yielding an
authentication failure.
would occur if the manufacturer were to destroy all
records of the ixivate key once the camera is produced.
(At that point the private key is no longer needed.) This
would eliminate the possibility of compromise via
industrial espionage or theft.
Finally, regular and free distribution of all valid public
keys is desirable to defeat a counterfeiter who has
learned of the encryption algorithm employed and has
written a program to produce digital signaUnes based on
his own private key. Decoding these forgeries would
require the use of a public key not generated by the
manufacturer. Freely distributing updated public key
lists would make it easy to identify and thwart such
attempts.
Uses
The single most obvious use of a Irustworthy camera
would be in situations where proof of image authenticity
is necessary; such as for legal evidence or insurance
claims. The inevitable transition to digital cameras and
electronically-transmitted images will also make it more
difficult for the professional photographer to protect his
or her image copyright, since with electronic cameras
there is no "original" to control, and works stored in
computer format tend to proliferate faster and with less
control from the author than the traditional distribution
method (which places image control in the hands of
whoever holds the original negative or transparency).
Just as it is common practice today to obtain model
releases for any published picture containing a
recognizable face, it is foreseeable that no electronic
image in the future will be published without first
having authenticated the image using the digital
signature of the camera which was or is registered to the
photographer.
This technique need not be limited to still digital
images. ]Becausedigital signatmes can be used to verify
any block of digital data, it can also be engineered into
digital video cameras and digital audio tape recorders.
In both these devices, a digital signature can be
generated sod recorded onto the medium each time the
recording process stops or pauses; this way each sound
byte or video "take" is hashed, encoded and written at
the time it's created.
A Special Border
Since the proposed camera is being initially targeted
towards legal authentication, a few additional features
can be implemented to better serve this use. A brightly-
coloredborder couldautomatically be generated as part
of each captured image file. Within the border would
appear textual information about the image: the date and
time it was taken, the ambient light level seen by the
camera at the time of exposure, the original color
temperature of the scene, the software version of the
camera's firmware, the camera's serial number, the
focusing distance of the lens at the time of exposure, a
unique sequence number, and (when the technology
allows for a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver
to he built into the camera) the geographical coordinates
of the camera, indicating where in the world you were
when the picture was taken. The ambient light level and
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color temperatttrereadings would be useful for getting a
feel for exactly what the scene was like at the time of
exposure; something a sensitive optical element might
inadvertently hide via automatic exposure and color
correction. The lens' focused distance is there to help
detect potential abuse of the trustworthy camera: taking
close-up pictures of a modified photo and trying to pass
it off as an unaltered original. Since all these textual
data in the colored border are part of the authenticated
image file, their credibility is also upheld when
authenticated by the verification software.
The accu/acy of the date and time information would
again be the responsibility of the secure microprocessor,
in addition to being able to keep its programming a
secret, it also would have a lithium battery powering a
system clock that was set to Universal (Greenwich
Mean) Time at the time of manufacture. If the timer
circuit ever fails or is tampered with, the system will be
programmed to fill the time and date fields with
XXXX's, eliminating the chance of a random time
stamp being mistaken for the actual time.
Higher Level of Security
Although the proposed Trustworthy Digital Camera
offers a satisfactory level of security, nevertheless there
still exists a small possibility that a determined saboteur
will be able to crack the camera's private key given an
extended amount of time. (No cryptographic scheme
will protect your data forever;, given sufficient time,
advancements in code breaking or improved computer
horsepower will be enough to render any given level of
cryptographic protection obsolete.) If the discovered
private key were then to be published, it would allow an
individual to generate authentic-looking digital
signatures on altered image files, essentially
undermining the credibility offered by the compcomised
came_'a. (The security level of other cameras in use, and
of images taken with those cameras, will still remain
high.)
Because of this risk, it would be wise for a manufacturer
of such cameras to regularly upgrade and enhance the
sophistication of the encryption implementation as
newer camera models are introduced, typically using
longer encryption/decryption key lengths and improved
encryption/decryption algorithms. It is expected that
evolving verification software (the public domain
software component of this authentication scheme
which is freely distributed) will then be designed to
recognize, identify and authenticate all previous
versions.
Because the encryption details must necessarily be
changed often (depending on the technological
capabilities of the day), no single image format, key
length or digital signature algorithm is being specified in
this disclosure 4.
Conclusion
The Trustworthy Digital Camera is an application of
existing technology toward the solution of an ever-
more-troubling social problem, the eroding credibility of
the photographic image. Although it will always be
possible to lie with a photograph (using such time-
honored techniques as false perspective and misleading
captions), this proposed device will prevent the
explosion of very capable personal computers from
driving up the incidence of doctored photographs being
passed off as truth.
The researchdescribedin this paperwas carried
out by the Jet PropulsionLaboratory,California
Instituteof Technology, undera contractwith the
NationalAeronauticsandSpace AdminislratiorL
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